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A. B. D i c k e r s o n : Kant on Representation and Objectivity. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press 2004. X, 217 pp. ISBN 0-521-83121-0.
By suggesting a new way of reading the concept of ‘representation’, this book
seeks to work out a new approach to the B-deduction. The explicitly stated aim is
to present an exegesis of Kant’s text, not a “variation on a Kantian theme” (2) or
a “rational reconstruction” (188). Dickerson’s overall plan is to first analyse in
chapter one the concept of representation largely without reference to Kant and
then to apply the results in the following chapters to the body of the B-deduction in
order to show that he can offer a cogent and charitable interpretation of it, one
which avoids the problems and errors that plague other interpretations.
Dickerson reminds his readers that representation (Vorstellung) for Kant means
literally ‘before-putting’ and not, for instance, one thing standing as proxy for an-
other. He explains his own specific understanding of the term by resorting to an
analogy with seeing things in pictures. In the same way that we see in colour
patches, e.g., a human face, the cognising mind grasps by an exercise of the imagin-
ation, i.e., by an act of synthesis, the object that is presented to it as its own modi-
fication. Crucial for the use made of the concept of representation later on in the
book is Dickerson’s claim that in cognising an object the mind grasps its own modi-
fications not simply as internal mental modifications but as representations of
something. This grasp is reflexive but only insofar as the mind is conscious of its
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own modifications. Dickerson at this point contrasts Kant’s representationalism
with other representationalist theories of the early modern era, theories that in his
view carry the burden of having to account for tasks with which Kant did not need
to concern himself. First, the comparison is made with the indirect realism of a
Descartes, who was faced with the problem of making an inference to the external
cause of a representation; then it is made with the idealism of a Berkeley, who had to
explain how representations are linked to one another.
After summarizing in chapter two the basic goals of the deduction as well as clar-
ifying a number of key Kantian teachings, such as the two-faculty model of cognition
(34f.), the status of empirical concepts (38f.), the notion of necessary universal valid-
ity (54), and things in themselves (75f.), Dickerson turns in his third chapter to a de-
tailed analysis of § 16. As Dickerson eventually finds himself at odds with most of the
standard interpretations of this text (90, 96), and as this is one of the central parts of
the book, a closer examination of it will be necessary. Dickerson first traces Kant’s
concept of apperception to Leibniz’s Nouveaux essais, without, however, offering any
evidence that Kant really was inspired by this work. In spite of repeatedly claiming
that an understanding of the historical context is important, Dickerson does not even
mention any of the other possible sources such as Christian Wolff or members of his
school (G. F. Meier, A. G. Baumgarten) or other authors whom Kant had studied
(C. A. Crusius, J. B. Merian, or J. N. Tetens), who had all used the term ‘appercep-
tion’.12 Of course, regardless of the exact provenance of Kant’s ‘apperception’, no-
body before him had treated it as the condition of synthetic judgements a priori or as
the highest point of transcendental philosophy, so a historical study of possible
sources will necessarily be only of limited value to an understanding of Kant’s usage
of the term.
Dickerson begins his own interpretation by claiming that Kant’s concept of ap-
perception arises from the Leibnizian version of it in combination with Kant’s own
conception of representation. Based on Dickerson’s proposed understanding of rep-
resentation, apperception is thus initially defined as “the reflexive act whereby the
mind grasps its own representations as representing” (81). Dickerson attributes
to Kant a distinction between self-awareness or self-consciousness, in which the ob-
jects of thought or cognition are the inner states, and apperception, in which the ob-
ject of thought is not the inner state itself but rather the object of that inner state.
Not convincing is Dickerson’s contention that this distinction is in Kant’s language
the distinction between inner sense and apperception (88f.). Kant does state that
the inner sense is the faculty “by means of which the mind intuits itself, or its inner
state” (A 22–23/B 37) but there he contrasts inner sense with outer sense and not
with apperception. Kant generally did not speak of inner sense as self-consciousness
and Dickerson himself later more aptly describes inner sense as a faculty of recep-
tivity (172). Dickerson ventures even farther from Kant’s text with his reading of
12 For a very recent overview of the differences between Leibniz’s concept of ‘apperception’
and that of Wolff and some later pre Kantian thinkers, see Udo Thiel: ‘Self Consciousness
and Personal Identity’, The Cambridge History of Eighteenth Century Philosophy, ed. Knud
Haakonssen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006, pp. 286 318, esp. 293 296.
Particularly noteworthy is the fact that Johann Bernhard Merian had used the expression
‘original apperception’ in an article that was first published in 1751.
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the opening sentence of § 16: “The I think must be able to accompany all my repre-
sentations; for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be
thought at all, which is as much as to say that the representation would either be im-
possible or else at least would be nothing for me” (B 131). Though already Kant’s
contemporaries K. L. Reinhold, Solomon Maimon, G. E. Schulze, and Fichte took
the beginning of § 16 as the point of departure for their more or less (un-)Kantian
theories of self-consciousness,13 and though nearly all modern commentators agree
that what is at stake here is some sort of ascription of representations to a self, Dick-
erson, consistently with his understanding of ‘representation’ and ‘apperception’,
claims that Kant is saying here that the subject must be able to think about or cognise
the objects of those representations (90–93). He does take Kant’s expression ‘I think’
into consideration but only as the formulation of the thesis that the representations
hang together so as to make up “my point of view on the world” (105).
There is no doubt that the deduction as a whole is, as Dickerson repeatedly main-
tains (e.g. 99), primarily a theory of the cognition of objects and not a theory of self-
consciousness. However, this by no means precludes Kant from first establishing
that representations must belong to one and the same subject if that subject is to
cognise those representations as an object.14 Dickerson’s denial that Kant deals with
the question of the ownership of mental states does not necessarily serve well his in-
tention to present a charitable interpretation of Kant. Especially against the back-
ground of empiricist theories of the self, ensuring that representations which lead to
cognition are indeed the representations of one and the same mind is not a “pointless
and bizarre ceremony” as Dickerson alleges (105). Dickerson is perhaps justified in
rejecting the interpretations that construe § 16 as a specific answer to Hume (107f.,
114f.), given that it is anything but certain that Kant really did take into account
Hume’s theory and Hume’s own misgivings about it.15 However, Kant obviously
was concerned with the defects of empiricist theories of the mind, as evidenced both
by his remark that empirical consciousness is dispersed (B 133) and by his overall
attempt to subsume empirical consciousness under the transcendental unity of ap-
perception.16
Dickerson’s next point about apperception, namely his contention that Kant is
defending a holistic rather than an atomistic conception of it, is also highly prob-
13 There is plentiful scattered material on the transformation of Kant’s concept of ‘appercep
tion’ by his immediate successors. A recent concentrated account is provided by Martin
Bondeli: Apperzeption und Erfahrung. Kants transzendentale Deduktion im Spannungsfeld
der frühen Rezeption und Kritik. Basel: Schwabe 2006, pp. 95 157.
14 The view that the B deduction includes both an ascription of mental states to an identical
subject and the constitution of the object of cognition goes in English language Kant schol
arship at least as far back as H. A. Prichard: Kant’s Theory of Knowledge. Oxford: Claren
don Press 1909, pp. 198 213.
15 Dickerson discusses mostly Patricia Kitcher’s Kant’s Transcendental Psychology. Doubts
about Kitcher’s reading of § 16 as a reply to Hume have previously been voiced, e.g., by Lo
thar Kreimendahl: Kant  Der Durchbruch von 1769. Köln: Dinter 1990, pp. 22f.
16 Though it is not at all clear whether Kant is downgrading a philosophical position or at
tacking a specific author. Locke, e.g., distinguished consciousness from reflection and held,
roughly speaking, that consciousness accompanies all acts of thought: ‘thinking consists in
being conscious that one thinks’; see Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II.i.19.
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lematic, especially in an exegetical attempt. Dickerson ascribes to Kant the theory
that the unity of a complex representation enjoys logical priority, and that therefore
the subject grasps through synthesis (and apperception) “the intuition as a whole,
and spontaneously segments it into a determinate combination of representations”
(122f.; my italics). As textual support he quotes Kant’s statement that the ‘manifold
in an intuition’ is grasped “by my adding one representation to the other and being
conscious of their synthesis” (B 133; Kant’s italics). How one can derive from
Kant’s talk of a process of ‘adding’ an assertion about the process of ‘segmenting’ is
not explained, though Dickerson defends Kant’s supposed holism at some length.
He does admit that he is alone on this point against all Kantian scholarship (141). It
seems that he is (mis)led by an otherwise interesting comparison that he makes be-
tween the unity of our grasp or of our apperception of a complex representation
and the problem of the ‘unity of proposition’ as this was examined, e.g., by Russell.
The point is simply that understanding a proposition such as ‘Jill loves Jack’ cannot
be reduced to an understanding of each of its components but requires an under-
standing of the unity of the proposition (110f.). It would seem that this potentially
helpful analogy is extended too far to offer a precise reading of the historical Kant.
The most valuable part of Dickerson’s book is his analysis of §§ 17–20 in his
chapter four. Here, his reading of ‘representation’ and ‘apperception’ accords far
better with Kant’s text. Dickerson claims that Kant’s point of departure in § 17 is
the idea that in apperceiving an intuition the subject apperceives the components as
hanging together so as to present an object (151). He plausibly contends that the ar-
gument of the B-deduction will be judged to be beset with the least inconsistencies if
one bears in mind that Kant is not trying to prove that some set of representations is
objective but rather that he is spelling out the necessary conditions of such objec-
tivity (155). Dickerson defends Kant’s argumentation by proposing that its goals
are more modest than is often assumed in the literature. Thus, for example, he sug-
gests that the second paragraph of § 17 merely emphasises that our cognition in-
volves both spontaneity and receptivity, rather than arguing for some conclusion
such as “representations relate to an object if and only if there is a unity of con-
sciousness”, a conclusion which does not follow from the premises (152–158). In a
similar fashion, Dickerson thinks that identifying the transcendental unity of apper-
ception with cognition of objects in § 18 is not an unproven problematic assump-
tion on Kant’s part but simply a perfectly legitimate statement of his position (169).
After his reconstruction of Kant’s argument in §§ 16–20, Dickerson skips to the
first half of § 26. Why he omits dealing with the intervening §§ 21–25 is not ex-
plained nor is it self-evident. In those sections, Kant presents arguments against an
extension of the validity of the categories by restricting them to the realm of poss-
ible experience. The stress on this anti-rationalistic stance would have fit reason-
ably well into Dickerson’s emphasis of the theory of the two sources of cognition:
while the first five sections of the deduction make a claim in favour of the intellec-
tual elements of cognition, the next five serve as a reminder of the importance of the
components contributed by sensibility. In regard to the first half of § 26, Dickerson
examines, above all, the question of the contribution that this passage makes to the
argument of the B-deduction. He points out that the first half of § 26 cannot be
intended to prove that the results of § 20, which concern only discursive cognition
in general, also apply to human cognition, as this is trivially true. Instead, he sug-
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gests that Kant’s argument is designed to show that “space and time are themselves
grasped through a category-governed synthesis, and that therefore they will possess
a category-determined structure” (199). Here, it would perhaps be more accurate to
maintain that Kant aims to prove (or explain) that (or how) the categories are valid
for spatio-temporally structured objects, given that the categories apply not to the
form of intuition but to formal intuition. Again without offering an explanation,
Dickerson does not discuss the second part of § 26 and the summary provided in
§ 27. An examination of the second half of § 26 may have saved him from another
blunder, namely the assertion that Kant can say that As cause Bs whereas Hume can
only say that they have been constantly conjoined. In fact, as Kant explains in § 26,
the deduction only grounds a ‘natura formaliter spectata’ but not also the special
laws of nature so that Kant can only claim that As and Bs necessarily have causes.
What these causes may specifically be can be discovered only empirically (see also
A 206–207/B 252).
As an exegesis of Kant’s text this book has a number of serious deficiencies. The
strained reading of key passages mentioned above is one point. Insufficient is also
Dickerson’s examination of the rich historical context in which Kant wrote, even if
one admits the potential limitations of such historical studies in view of the massive
transformation to which Kant subjected the philosophical tradition. Dickerson dis-
cusses only some of the major philosophers (basically just Descartes, Leibniz, Ber-
keley, and Hume), omitting completely the many less well known thinkers whose
writings Kant had read. One may also question the sense of ‘refuting’ at some length
in an exegetical effort the works of authors who themselves were obviously not in-
terested in exegesis (e.g. Strawson, Bennett). However, if there is some doubt about
the value of this book as an exegesis, it does, when taken as a free interpretation,
offer refreshingly new perspectives on Kant’s text, especially on the concepts of
‘representation’ and ‘grasping’ as well as, within the context of the deduction,
‘apperception’. It opens up a new approach to a notoriously difficult piece of philo-
sophical writing and is bound to contribute in a positive manner to future dis-
cussions of it.
Vilem Mudroch, Zürich
